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FIRST AMENDMENT- OBSCENITY
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
Smith v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
Splawn v. California, 97 S. Ct. 1987 (1977).
Ward v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2085 (1977).
The Supreme Court this past term decided
four cases dealing with various aspects of the
ability of federal and state government to pun-
ish the transport and sale of obscene materials.
In Ward v. Illinois' the Court held that the
Illinois obscenity statute, 2 as interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court, satisfied the specificity
requirements of Miller v. California3 and, there-
fore, was not unconstitutionally vague. In
Splawn v. California4 the Court affirmed the
relevance of the circumstances of sales and
distribution to a prosecution for the sale of
obscene material. In Smith v. United States5 the
Court ruled that a state legislature's decision
not to prohibit the sale of obscene materials to
adults did not constitute a conclusive definition
of contemporary community standards in that
state6 and did not circumscribe the ability of
the federal government to prosecute, in that
state, a violation of the federal statute prohibit-
ing the mailing of obscene materials.7 In Marks
v. United States' the Court held that the stan-
dards announced in Miller v. California9 were
' 97 S. Ct. 2085 (1977).
2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20 (1971). See note
52 infra.
3 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4 97 S. Ct. 1987 (1977).
5 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
6 The importance of state and local community
standards in obscenity cases was declared in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller the Court
held, inter alia, that in determining whether some-
thing is obscene the trier of fact should determine
"whether 'the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, [408 U.S. 229] at 230 [(1972)],
quoting Roth v. United States, supra, [354 U.S. 476] at
489 [(1957)]." 413 U.S. at 24. The Court went on to
hold that the "contemporary community standards"
to be applied need not be national standards, but
rather, that application of state standards was consti-
tutionally acceptable. Id.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). See note 47 infra.
8 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
9413 U.S. 15 (1973).
not to be applied retroactively to the extent
that such retroactive application is to the detri-
ment of a defendant in a criminal case.
The Court heard these four cases in order to
consider issues left unresolved in Miller v. Cali-
fornia and companion cases.10 In Miller the
Court held that a trier of fact in an obscenity
case must determine:
(a) whether "the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin , supra, [408
U.S. 229] at 230 [(1972)], quoting Roth v. United
States, supra, [354 U.S. 476] at 489 [(1957)]; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Miller "marked a significant departure"'2
from the previous holdings of the Court gov-
erning obscenity. Prior to Miller, in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts," a plurality opinion of the Court
declared that "[a] book cannot be proscribed
unless it is found to be utterly without redeem-
ing social value."14 The Court in Miller decided
that the "utterly without redeeming social value"
10 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973), (the ability of states to prohibit the distribution
of hard core pornography to consenting adults);
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (whether
unillustrated books could be constitutionally banned
as obscene); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (holding, inter alia, that
although Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
created a constitutional right to possess obscene ma-
terials, there was no corresponding right to import
such materials); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973) (the ability of the federal government to pro-
hibit the interstate transport of obscene materials in
light of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
11 413 U.S. at 24.
12 413 U.S. at 194.
13 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
14 Id. at 419 (emphasis in original) (hereinafter
referred to as the Memoirs standard).
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test or Memoirs standard was unworkable and
placed an impossible burden upon the prose-
cution." The Miller Court abandoned the Mem-
oirs standard and adopted a test for obscenity
which included a determination of "whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political or scientific value."16
Miller, in addition to broadening the types of
works which could be declared obscene,'17 re-
quired that obscenity laws, or definitive inter-
pretations of those laws, define proscribed ma-
terial."8 This specificity requirement was for-
mulated in order to provide dealers in ques-
tionably obscene material with fair notice of
possible criminal prosecution.1 9
The petitioners in Marks v. United States
20
were charged with violation of two federal
obscenity statutes. 2' The acts upon which these
charges were based occurred prior to the
Court's decision in Miller. The petitioners un-
successfully argued in the district court 22 that
the jury be instructed according to the stan-
dards of obscenity laid down in Memoirs. 2 The
trial court, instead, applied the standards an-
nounced in Miller, stating that "[tihe Miller
group did not create a new definition of illegal
conduct, but merely clarified earlier concepts
of obscenity of which the defendants were
constructively aware. ' 24 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the decision 25 and noted that the Memoirs stan-
'5 413 U.S. at 22.
1
6 Id. at 24.
17 413 U.S. at 194.
18 413 U.S. at 27.
19 d. at 27.
20 413 U.S. 188.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970) in relevant part provides:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or
foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or
distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, let-
ter, writing, print, ... shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) in relevant part provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to com-
mit any offense against the United States or to
defraud the United States ... and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
22 United States v. Marks, 364 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.
Ky. 1973).
2 See text accompanying notes 15-16supra.
24 364 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
21 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975).
dard "had never been approved by a plurality
of more than three Justices at any one time"
2'
and that the material was obscene regardless of
the standard used by the trial court.
27
The Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing
with the findings of both the district court and
the court of appeals. The majority opinion 28 of
the Court, noting the difference between Miller
and Memoirs, held that a retroactive application
of the broader definition of obscenity used in
Miller would deprive the petitioners of due
process. The Court observed that, due to the
broad language of the federal obscenity stat-
utes, defendants in federal obscenity cases are
particularly vulnerable to shifts in judicial inter-
pretations of the statute. In order to accord
dealers in "dicey" materials fair notice the
Court ruled that the due process clause 29 pre-
cluded the retroactive application of the stan-
dards announced in Miller to the extent that
such retroactive application would impose
criminal liability for conduct occurring prior to
Miller.
The Court also rejected the contention of
the court of appeals that the holding of Memoirs
could be ignored because it had never been
approved, by more than a plurality of three
Justices. The Court noted that, in addition to
the three Justices who adopted the Memoirs
standard, 3 three other justices concurred in
the decision on broader grounds. 3' The Court
ruled that the hofting of the Memoirs Court
should be seen as the "position taken by those
Members who concurred on the narrowest
grounds. '3 2 The Court held, therefore, that
Memoirs was the law until Miller was decided.
The Court went on to hold that the ruling of
the court of appeals that the material was
obscene, regardless of the standards used by
2
6 Id. at 919-20.
27 Id. at 921.
28 The Court's opinion was written by Justice Pow-
ell and joined by Burger, CJ., Blackmun, Rehnquist,
and White, JJ. Brerinan, Stewart, Marshall, and
Stevens, JJ., filed separate opinions in each of the
four obscenity cases decided last term, and in Marks,
they concurred in part and dissented in part.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30 Warren, C.J., Brennan and Fortas, JJ.
31 Black and Douglas, JJ., concurred on the
ground that the government has no power to sup-
press the expression of ideas. Stewart, J., concurred
on the ground that the government only has the
power to suppress hard core pornography.
2 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
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the jury, was an inadequate substitute for a
determination by a properly instructed jury.3
In Splawn v. Californiaa4 the Court affirmed
the 1971 conviction 35 of the petitioner, who was
charged with the sale of two reels of obscene
film in violation of the California obscenity
statute. 3" Petitioner raised several points in
challenging his conviction. The major chal-
lenge was based on the charge instructing the
jury to consider the circumstances surrounding
the sale and distribution of the films in deter-
mining their obscenity vel non. The petitioner's
challenge to the introduction of evidence sur-
rounding the sale and distribution of the mate-
rials rested on two contentions, both of which
were rejected by the Court.
The first contention was that consideration
of the circumstances surrounding the sale of
the materials violated the petitioner's first
amendment right of free speech. The majority
opinion rejected this contention, stating:
"There is no doubt that as a matter of First
Amendment obscenity law, evidence of pan-
dering to prurient interests in the creation,
promotion, or dissemination of material is rele-
vant in determining whether the material is
obscene.13 7 The Court based this decision on
its holdings in Ginzburg v. New York3 s and Haml-
3 430 U.S. at 196-97 n.l1.
34 97 S. Ct. 1987 (1977).
The petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the
California First District Court of Appeal. The state
supreme court denied review. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judg-
ment and remanded for consideration in light of
Miller v. California. Following the remand the court
of appeals again affirmed the conviction, the state
supreme court denied a motion for a rehearing, and
the United States Supreme Court again granted
certiorari, 429 U.S. 997 (1977).
36 CAL. PExAL CODE § 311.2 (1970) which states, in
relevant part:
(a) Every person who knowingly sends or causes
to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought,
into this state for sale or distribution, or in this
state possesses, prepares, publishes, or prints,
with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others,
or who offers to distribute, distributes, or ex-
hibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of
a misdemeanor.
3- 97 S. Ct. at 1990.
38 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Court, in Ginzburg,
upheld the petitioner's conviction for violation of the
federal obscenity statute. 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1964); see
note 46 infra. The prosecution at the petitioner's trial
assumed that the petitioner's publications, stand-
ing alone, might not be obscene. The prosecution,
therefore, charged that the material in question was
ing v. United States.39 The Court, in both Ginz-
burg and Hamling, held that evidence of the
circumstances surrounding sales and distribu-
tion was relevant to a determination of obscen-
ity vel non.
40
The petitioner's other claim maintained that,
at the time that the petitioner committed the
acts for which he was prosecuted, evidence of
pandering to prurient interests was not relevant
to a determination of obscenity vel non. The
petitioner based this contention on the case of
People v. Noroff.41 The petitioner interpreted
obscene in the context of the circumstances of pro-
duction and sale. The petitioner challenged his con-
viction and the Court stated that: "We agree that the
question of obscenity may include consideration of
the setting in which the publications were presented
as an aid to determining the question of obscenity."
383 U.S. at 465-66. The Court noted that: "Where
an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornogra-
phy is shown with respect to material lending itself
to such exploitation through pervasive treatment or
description of sexual matters, such evidence may
support the determination that the material is ob-
scene even though in other contexts the material
would escape such condemnation." 383 U.S. at 475-
76.79 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In Hamling the Court af-
firmed the petitioner's conviction for violation of the
federal obscenity statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970); see
note 46 infra. The petitioner challenged his convic-
tion on several grounds, including whether the jury
was improperly instructed to consider the manner of
distribution and circumstances of production in de-
termining whether the petitioner had mailed obscene
matter. The Court held, inter alia, that instructions
to the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding
the sale and distribution of the material in question
"was clearly consistent with our decision in Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), which held that
evidence of pandering could be relevant in the deter-
mination of the obscenity of the materials at issue."
418 U.S. at 130.
40 383 U.S. at 470; 418 U.S. at 130.
41 67 Cal. 2d 791, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479
(1967). The defendant in Noroff was charged with
possessing obscene matter for distribution. The trial
court, rejecting the state's claim that the material was
obscene on its face, ruled that the material in question
fell within the constitutional protection of the first
and fourteenth amendments. The prosecution, it
must be noted, did not charge that the petitioner
committed the offense in the context of the circum-
stances of sale and distribution. Rather, the prosecu-
tion recognized that the only relevant issue was the
obscenity of the magazine per se. The California
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court
and rejected the argument, advanced for the first
time on appeal, "that the trial court should have
permitted the prosecution to go to the jury with
evidence bearing upon the defendant's 'pandering'
1977]
Noroff as holding that evidence of the circum-
stances surrounding sale and distribution was
not admissible in a determination of obscenity
vel non. The petitioner argued that, under
Noroff, evidence of pandering to prurient inter-
ests should not have been used against the
petitioner and that, but for the passage of the
statute which specifically permitted4 2 consider-
ation of the circumstances surrounding sale
and distribution, evidence of pandering could
not have been admitted at the petitioner's trial.
The petitioner's argument concluded that al-
lowing the jury to consider evidence of pander-
ing, solely on the basis of the enactment of the
California statute, amounted to an ex post facto
enactment and, therefore, was a violation of
the petitioner's constitutional rights.
43
The Court rejected petitioner's claim and,
instead, accepted the interpretation placed
upon Noroff by the California courts. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals did not read Noroff as
dealing with the use, in a determination of
obscenity vel non, of evidence of the circum-
stances surrounding sale and distribution.
Rather, the California court saw Noroff as "'re-
jecting the concept of pandering non-obscene
material as a separate crime' "'44 under Califor-
nia law. Therefore, according to the California
court's interpretation of Noroff, evidence of
pandering to prurient interests was admissible
in obscenity trials both before and after the
passage of the statute which explicitly stated
that such evidence was admissible and applica-
tion of the statute to the petitioner was not an
ex post facto enactment.
In Smith v. United States45 the Court dealt
of the magazine in question." Id., 63 Cal. Rptr. at
576, 433 P.2d at 480. The California Supreme Court
stated that: "[F]irst, the indictment did not charge
the defendants with pandering; second, the state
legislature has created no such crime." Id.
42 CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a)(2) (1970) states in
relevant part:
In prosecutions under this chapter, where cir-
cumstances of production, presentation, sale,
dissemination, distribution, or publicity indicate
that the matter is being commercially exploited
by the defendant for the sake of its prurient
appeal, such evidence is probative with respect
to the nature of the matter and can justify the
conclusion that the matter is utterly without
redeeming social value.
" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
44 97 S. Ct. at 1991 (quoting Petitioner's Brief,
Appendix at ix, citing California Court of Appeals
decision).
15 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
with the relationship between the obscenity
laws in a particular state and the ability of the
federal government to prosecute violations of
federal obscenity statutes. The petitioner was
convicted, in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, for violation
of a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of
obscene materials. 4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
petitioner's conviction and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
47
The petitioner challenged his conviction on
several grounds. One challenge was based on
the fact that, at the time petitioner committed
the acts upon which his conviction was based,
Iowa had no statute proscribing the sale of
obscene material to adults .48 Petitioner unsuc-
cessfully argued that the Iowa obscenity statute
set out the relevant contemporary community
standards in the state of Iowa. Petitioner also
maintained that the prosecution had not
proved that the materials at issue offended
that standard.
In a plurality opinion 49 the Court rejected
46 The statute states, in relevant part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy
or vile article, matter, thing, device, or sub-
stance . . . [i]s declared to be unmailable matter
and shall not be conveyed in the mails or deliv-
ered from any post office.... Whoever know-
ingly uses the mails for the mailing ... of
anything declared by this section to be nonmail-
able ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first offense, and shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both, for each such offense there-
after.
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
47 426 U.S. 946 (1976).
48 The petitioner was convicted for conduct which
occurred between February and October, 1974. The
Iowa statutes had, for many years prior to 1973,
prohibited the mailing, sale, and distribution of any
"obscene, lewd, indecent, lascivious or filthv" mate-
rial. IOWA CODE §§ 725.5, 725.6 (1973). However, in
light of Miller v. California, the Iowa Supreme Court
ruled that a related Iowa obscenity statute was over-
broad and vague. State v. Wendelstedt, 213 N.W.2d
652 (Ia. 1973). The United States Supreme Court
also assumed that Wendelstedt invalidated §§ 725.5
and 725.6. The Iowa legislature, in 1974, repealed
the existing obscenity statutes and enacted a specific
statute which only proscribed the sale of obscene
material to minors. IowA CODE § 725.2 (1974). In
1976 the Iowa legislature enacted statutes, to take
effect in 1978, that, once again, proscribe the sale of
obscene materials to both adults and iinors.
" The opinion was written by Blackmun. J.. and
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and White.
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these contentions and held that the ability of a
state to proscribe or allow the dissemination of
sexually explicit material has no conclusive ef-
fect upon the ability of the federal government
to prohibit the mailing of such materials, even
though such mailing was intrastate. The Court
noted that, although local laws dealing with
obscenity were relevant evidence of community
standards, they were not conclusive of such
standards nor binding upon the federal gov-
ernment.
The Court asserted several reasons for its
holding that state laws are not conclusive evi-
dence of the community standards. The Court
noted that state obscenity laws may be affected
by a possible desire to conserve prosecutorial
resources or by a reliance on federal prosecu-
tion of such materials. The Court concluded
that for these reasons Iowa's obscenity laws did
not necessarily aid in determining the commu-
nity standards concerning such materials. The
Court also noted that the petitioner was prose-
cuted under a federal statute and that the
question of whether the petitioner violated the
statute was to be decided during the petitioner's
trial in the federal courts and could not be
determined by acts of the Iowa legislature.
Another challenge to petitioner's conviction
was based on the voir dire questions submitted
to the jury. The petitioner submitted to the
trial court six proposed questions for voir dire.
Five of these questions dealt with the jurors'
understanding and knowledge of contempo-
rary community standards in the Southern Dis-
trict of Iowa toward the depiction of sex and
nudity. The trial court declined to ask these
five questions.
The Court held that the trial court properly
declined to ask petitioner's questions, deciding
that "[t]he particular inquiries requested by
petitioner would not have elicited useful infor-
mation about the jurors' qualifications to apply
contemporary community standards in an ob-
jective way." 50 The Court went on to view the
question of community standards to be similar
to the question of "reasonableness." Although,
the Court conceded, specific questions about a
juror's participation and involvement in. the
community might be relevant, general ques-
JJ.. Powell, J., concurred in a separate opinion.
Brennan,J., filed a dissent and wasjoined by Stewart
and Marshall, JJ.. Stevens, J., filed a separate dis-
senting opinion.
50 97 S. Ct. at 1767.
tions of a juror's knowledge of contemporary
community standards had no bearing on a
juror's ability to hear petitioner's case.
The relevance of state law to petitioner's case
and the issue ofjuror knowledge of community
standards coalesce into a question of the nature
of the evidence to be presented in obscenity
cases. The prosecution, at petitioner's trial,
presented no evidence of what the relevant
community standards were. In order to meet
the burden of proof laid out in Miller v. Califor-
nia the prosecution merely presented the ma-
terials covered by the indictment. Petitioner,
on the other hand, attempted to gauge the
jurors' knowledge of community standards in
Iowa and also attempted to prove that the
petitioner's materials did not offend the com-
munity standards. Petitioner unsuccessfully
presented the jury with the Iowa laws dealing
with sexually explicit materials and with exam-
ples of the sexually explicit materials which
were available for purchase in Iowa. The
Court, however, held that the jury was free to
determine the relevant community standards
in light of their own understanding of contem-
porary community standards regardless of the
relevant state statute.
Ward v. Illinois51 dealt with the exactitude
which the Court requires of state obscenity
statutes. The petitioner sold two sado-maso-
chistic publications and was convicted, in 1971,
for violation of the Illinois obscenity statute.5 2
The petitioner's appeal was not heard until
after the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
California.- Despite the changes made by the
Miller decision in the law governing obscenity
prosecutions, r1 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Third District affirmed the petitioner's con-
51 97 S. Ct. 2085 (1977).
52 The statute, in relevant part, states:
A person commits obscenity when, with knowl-
edge of the nature of content thereof ... he:
(1) Sells, delivers or provides, or offers or agrees
to sell, deliver or provide any obscene writing,
picture, record or other representation or em-
bodiment of the obscene; .... A thing is ob-
scene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful
or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion,
and if it goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation
of such matters. A thing is obscene even though
the obscenity is latent, as in the case of undevel-
oped photographs.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20 (1971).
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 74-77 infra.
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viction.55 The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed," rejecting the petitioner's challenges
to his conviction, one of which was that the
Illinois obscenity statute did not meet the spe-
cificity requirements of Miller.57 The Illinois
Supreme Court held that its decision in People
v. Ridens58 interpreted the Illinois obscenity
statute so that the statute met such specificity
requirements.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed
petitioner's conviction 9 despite various conten-
tions made by the petitioner. ° One of these
11 People v. Ward, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1045 (3d Dist.
1975).
56 63 Il1. 2d 437 (1976).
57 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller held, inter alia, that in
order for obscene material to be proscribed it must
depict conduct which is specifically defined in the
applicable state law. The Court went on to give an
example of a sufficiently specific obscenity statute,
stating that:
It is possible, however, to give a few plain
examples of what a state statute could define
for regulation under part (b) of the standard
announced in this opinion, supra:
(a) Patently offensive representations or de-
scriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or de-
scriptions of masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Id. at 25.
5 59 Ill. 2d 362 (1974). The history of People v.
Ridens is complex. First, the defendants were con-
victed of violation of the Illinois obscenity statute.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20 (1969). (See note 52
supra.) Their convictions were then affirmed by the
Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Ridens, 51 111. 2d
410 (1972). The United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the cause for further consideration in
light of Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 912 (1973). The
Illinois Supreme Court, upon further consideration,
held that the Illinois obscenity statute was not upcon-
stitutionally vague, was not unconstitutionally over-
broad, and was in keeping with the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Miller. 59 Ill. 2d 362
(1974). The Illinois Supreme Court, therefore, af-
firmed the defendants' conviction. The petitioner in
Ward v. Illinois challenged the finding of the Illinois
Supreme Court that the Illinois obscenity statute was
in keeping with the decision in Miller.
" The Court's opinion was written by White, J.,
and joined by Burger, CJ., Rehnquist, Powell, and
Blackmun, JJ..
60 It must be noted that the petitioner challenged
his conviction on two levels. The petitioner main-
tained that the Illinois statute was not in keeping
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Miller and that the Illinois statute violated provisions
of the United States Constitution. Therefore, the
Court's holding in Ward is formulated both in terms
contentions was that the Illinois statute failed
to meet the specificity requirement of Miller.
Absent such compliance the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague6 ' because it failed to give
the petitioner notice that he was dealing in
proscribed materials. The Court rejected this
claim, noting that, regardless of whether the
Illinois statute met the requirements of Miller,
the Illinois courts had given petitioner ade-
quate notice that he was dealing in proscribed
materials through their decisions in various
obscenity cases.
62
The petitioner also claimed that the materials
upon which his conviction was based could not
be constitutionally proscribed. Petitioner's ar-
gument was that the Miller decision's example
of an adequately specific obscenity statute" was
a complete description of those materials that
could be constitutionally proscribed, that sado-
masochistic materials were not included in
Miller's example of an adequately specific stat-
ute, and that, therefore, sado-masochistic ma-
terials could not be constitutionally proscribed.
The Court rejected this claim, maintaining that
Miller's model statute was merely an example
of the type of material which an obscenity
statute could proscribe and the manner in
which such material could be proscribed. The
Court stated that the Miller example of an
adequately specific statute was not meant to be
an exhaustive list of all materials which could
be proscribed and that the Miller decision had
not intended to extend constitutional protec-
tion to flagellatory materials. 64
The petitioner also contended that the Illi-
nois statute did not meet the specificity require-
ment of Miller65 and, consequently, was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad.66 The Illinois Supreme
of the constitution (the petitioner's vagueness and
overbreadth arguments are constitutional in nature)
and in terms of the Court's decision in Miller (the
petitioner's specificity argument was based on a claim
that the Illinois statute failed to comply with the
requirements of the Miller decision).
61 When a statute is unconstitutionally vague it
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
62 People v. Sikora, 32 Ill. 2d 260 (1965); Blue
Island v. DeVilbiss, 41 111. 2d 135 (1969); Chicago '.
Geraci, 46 Ill. 2d 576 (1970).
3 See note 57 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2089.
n See note 57 supra.
66 The overbreadth argument differs from the
vagueness argument in that the overbreadth doctrine
[Vol. 68
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Court, in People v. Ridens,67 held that the Illinois
obscenity statute met the specificity require-
ments of Miller and was constitutional. The
Illinois decision in Ridens, however, left unclear
whether the Illinois Supreme Court merely
interpreted the Illinois statute, as written, as
being in keeping with the specificity require-
ments of Miller or whether the Illinois court
adopted, as an exclusive limitation on the Illi-
nois statute, the example given in Miller.
The United States Supreme Court held that
the Illinois court adopted, as a limitation upon
the Illinois statute, Miller's example of an ade-
quately specific statute. The Court went on to
hold that the Illinois court's adoption of the
example set out in Miller gave the statute the
specificity required by Miller and, therefore,
the statute was not unconstitutionally over-
broad.6
8
The Court also held that the Illinois statute
was not unconstitutionally overbroad despite
the absence of an exhaustive list of the sexual
conduct the depiction of which may be held
obscene. The Court stated that the Illinois
statute was not overbroad if the Illinois courts
recognized "the limitations of the kinds of sex-
ual conduct which may not be depicted or
represented under the obscenity laws." 69 The
Court noted that recognition of the limitations
upon the kind of materials which may be pros-
cribed was deemed adequate in the Court's
decisions regarding the federal obscenity stat-
ute.
70
"involves scrutiny to determine whether a statute is
too sweeping in coverage-and if so, invalid on its
face.... The doctrine focuses directly on the need
for precision in drafting to avoid conflict with the
first amendment rights." Note: The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 845 (1970)
(footnotes omitted). The vagueness doctrine, on the
other hand, deals with whether a statute "either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation." Conally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
67 59 111. 2d 362 (1974).
68 97 S. Ct. at 2090.69 Id. at 2091 (emphasis in original).
70 The Court interpreted the federal obscenity
statutes in light of Miller in Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87 (1974). The Court held, inter alia, that
the broad language of the federal obscenity statutes
was limited by the Court's decision in Miller, that the
federal obscenity statute need not be interpreted as
requiring proof of uniform national standards, and
that defendants who were convicted prior to the
The Court's efforts in all of the obscenity
cases handed down last term can be seen as an
attempt to build a unified, coherent body of
law dealing with the proscription of sexually
explicit materials. The decisions are all at-
tempts to clarify the Miller decision, the corner-
stone of recent federal obscenity law. Yet, de-
spite the Court's efforts, the obscenity rulings
have met severe criticisms from within the
Court. These criticisms go to the general con-
stitutional issues as well as the facts of the
specific cases.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Ste-
vens, in each of the obscenity decisions handed
down, voiced basic opposition to the current
state of the laws dealing with obscene materials.
These four Justices issued separate opinions in
each of the obscenity decisions. These opinions
expressed deep misgivings about the constitu-
tionality of current obscenity laws.
Justice Stevens' basic stance toward current
obscenity laws was voiced in his opinion in
Marks,71 in which he maintained that the crimi-
nal prosecution in question was constitutionally
impermissible. The unconstitutionality of such
prosecution is grounded, according to Justice
Stevens, in the fact that first amendment values
are implicated in the proscription of obscene
materials, in the inconsistency of punishing a
defendant for providing a party with materials
which the party has a constitutional right to
possess, 72 and in the fact that evenhanded en-
Miller decision but whose cases were on direct review
at the time Miller was decided were entitled to any
benefit of the constitutional principles enunciated by
Miller.
7' It is significant to note the position taken by
Justice Stevens. This was his first opportunity to
fully express his views on the current state of the law
governing obscenity prosecutions. Justice Stevens'
opinions last term place him firmly in opposition to
the actions taken by the Court in this area. There-
fore, despite Justice Douglas' retirement, the entire
current framework for deciding obscenity cases is
maintained by the narrowest of margins. A shift in
the Court's personnel could lead to a total abandon-
ment of Miller and its progeny. The Miller decision
itself was the product of such a shift: four of the five
justices who joined the Miller decision (Burger, C.J.,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun, JJ.) were not on
the Court when Memoirs was decided.
72 The Court, in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), held that the possession of obscene material




forcement of current obscenity laws is impossi-
ble because of the intolerably vague nature of
the current obscenity laws.
The most fundamental type of disagreement
with the Court's obscenity decisions was also
voiced by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Mar-
shall. The position taken by Justices Brennan
and Stewart is consistent with their views in
Miller. They maintain that "at least in the
absence of distribution to juveniles or obstruc-
tive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state
and federal governments from attempting
wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials
on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' con-
tents. ' 73 In keeping with the above position
Justices Stewart and Brennan maintained, in
all of the obscenity cases decided last term,
that each of the challenged obscenity statutes
was constitutionally overbroad. This conclusion
was based on the fact that each of the chal-
lenged statutes proscribed the sale or distribu-
tion of obscene materials to all persons, includ-
ing consenting adults. According to Justices
Brennan and Stewart, such broad proscription
goes beyond the constitutional ability of state
and federal government to deal with such ma-
terials.
Justice Marshall voiced similar misgivings
about the constitutionality of current obscenity
statutes. Justice Marshall, who joined Justices
Brennan and Stewart in Miller and Slaton, also
joined their dissenting opinions in Marks, Smith
and Splawn. These three members of the
Court, therefore, have consistently maintained
that the first.and fourteenth amendments pro-
hibit the state and federal government from
proscribing the sale and distribution of sexually
explicit materials to consenting adults.
The positions taken by Justices Stevens, Mar-
shall, Brennan and Stewart are fundamental
criticisms of the Court's actions last Term.
Their criticisms transcend any specific holding
of the Court and are constitutionally well
founded. The Court, in Miller, appeared to
inject some precision into the law governing
obscenity prosecutions. This Term's obscenity
decisions, however, seem to renege on the
promise, held out by Miller, that "these specific
prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer
- 413 U.S. 49, 113 (Brennan, Stewart, and Mar-
shall, JJ., dissenting).
in such material that his public and commercial
activities may bring prosecution."7 4
Last Term's obscenity decisions must be
viewed in light of the three part test enunciated
in Miller.75 This test contained both good and
bad news for dealers in sexually explicit mate-
rials. The bad news consisted of the fact that
the "serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value" part of the test encompassed a
broader range of materials than the Memoirs
test of- "utterly without redeeming social
value."76 The good news consisted of the
Court's assurances that obscenity statutes were
going to have to be specific 7 and the possibility
that a body of law would develop which would
permit identification of local community stan-
dards and make dealers in sexually explicit
materials aware of whether or not they will
incur criminal liability.
The Court's decisions in Smith and Ward,
however, have withdrawn the good news of-
fered by Miller. The decision in Smith is such
that a defendant in an obscenity case is not
guaranteed a method of determining the ju-
rors' understanding of local community stan-
dards. Furthermore, a defendant has no guar-
antee that uncontested evidence about relevant
community standards will have any impact on
the jury's decision. The prosecution in an ob-
scenity case, on the other hand, is not required
to introduce any evidence of what the relevant
local community standards are or whether the
defendant's actions have violated those stan-
dards. The prosecutor merely has to present
the materials in question and allow the jurors,
using only their personal views, to reach their
conclusions.
The Court, in affirming the petitioner's con-
viction in Smith, has granted jurors in obscenity
cases a great deal of freedom to apply their
subjective standards to the materials in ques-
tion. Smith allows jurors to bring personal
prejudices into the jury box, gives the defend-
ant no way to detect these prejudices, allows
these prejudices to serve as the basis for the
jurors' rejection of evidence presented by the
defendant and permits jurors to base a criminal
conviction on their decision to allow prejudices
to outweigh uncontested evidence presented
- 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
7. See text accompanying note 11 .upra.
76 430 U.S. at 191.
77 413 U.S. at 24.
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by the defendant. Under Smith, therefore,
there is no hope that predictable and regular
sets of community standards will develop. In-
stead, obscenity decisions will be based on the
varying subjective opinions, however formu-
lated, of the jurors.
Ward also cut back on the promise held out
by Miller by damaging any hopes for specificity
in obscenity statutes. Ward held that statutes
need not exhaustively list the acts or conduct
which may not be depicted. Instead, the Court
held that the Illinois obscenity statute was not
overbroad if "the Illinois court recognizes the
limitations on the kinds of sexual conduct which
may not be represented or depicted under the
obscenity laws."78
The Court, furthermore, reasoned that pre-
vious Illinois obscenity cases adequately warned
the petitioner that he was dealing in proscribed
materials. Under such reasoning, once an ini-
tial set of dealers in sexually explicit materials
is prosecuted, all dealers in such materials are
deemed to be adequately warned. As pointed
out in Justice Stevens' dissent, however, such
reasoning does away with the need for states to
adhere to the specificity requirement of Miller.
Also, state legislators are no longer required to
draw up detailed obscenity statutes because,
under Ward, obscenity statutes are not required
to exhaustively list the proscribed materials. As
noted by Justice Stevens, Ward allows individ-
uals to be prosecuted although the materials in
question are not specifically described in the
relevant obscenity statute. 79
There are, in addition to the Court's cutting
back on the promises held out by Miller, other
problems with last term's obscenity decisions.
One such problem is that Smith increases the
possibility that small communities will impose
their values and standards upon the nation's
media centers and that the right of free speech
will vary from community to community. The
increased possibility of local control over the
national media and of varying first amendment
standards stems from the Court's willingness to
allow obscenity convictions to be based on the
findings of a jury using standards drawn from
a narrow segment of the population and the
Court's willingness to allow jurors to reach
their conclusions on the basis of their personal
experiences.
78 97 S. Ct. at 2091.
79 Id. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The narrowing of the geographical base
from which standards are drawn was justified
by the Court in Miller.80 Miller rejected the
contention that questionably obscene materials
should be measured against a national stan-
dard. The Court stated that a standard which
insured that the material in question be 'judged
by its impact on an average person, rather
than a particularly susceptible or sensitive per-
son"81 was constitutionally adequate. This nar-
rowing of the geographical base was further
discussed in Jenkins v. Georgia,8 2 which held
that although Miller approved the use of state-
wide community standards, it did not mandate
their use. Instead, according to Jenkins, states
have great freedom in defining the community
from which contemporary community stan-
dards are drawn. The combination of basing
federal convictions on the narrow perspective
of a small segment of the population and grant-
ing jurors great freedom to apply their per-
sonal standards raises serious free speech and
free press questions.
The ability of a narrow and unrepresentative
group to exercise control over the right to free
speech is, however, not an absolute one. The
limits to this ability consist of the "ultimate
power of appellate courts to conduct an inde-
pendent review of constitutional claims when
necessary"' 3 and the fact that only "hard core"
pornography may be constitutionally pro-
scribed.84 However, the lack of a clear defini-
tion of hard core pornographys5 and the diffi-
so Miller held, inter alia, that the trier of fact in an
obscenity case may measure the issues of prurient
appeal and patent offensiveness by the standard that
prevails in the local community and need not employ
a national standard.
81 413 U.S. at 33.
82 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
8 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25.
8 Id. at27.
n The difficulty of defining "hard core" pornog-
raphy is illustrated by the problems which Justice
Stewart met in attempting to define those materials
which should be categorized as "hard core" pornog-
raphy. Justice Stewart's attempt ended in conclusion
that:
I shall not today attempt further to define the
kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart,
J., concurring). Justice Stewart's "I know it when I
see it" test has been the subject of much commentary.
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culties involved in awaiting appellate reversal
of jury decisions are such that even these re-
straints upon the discretion of a local jury is of
limited benefit to dealers in sexually explicit
materials.
Therefore, the threat of narrow-minded
opinions controlling the national media and,
consequently, of a first amendment standard
which varies from community to community is
a real one. Although this possibility appears
constitutionally untenable, the Court is willing
to accept it. The Court, however, does not
view its decisions in this light. Instead, the
Court defended its decision in Miller with the
contention that:
Under a national Constitution, fundamental
First Amendment limitations on the powers of
the States do not vary from community to com-
munity, but this does not mean that there are,
or should or can be, fixed, uniform national
standards of precisely what appeals to the "pru-
rient interest" or what is "patently offensive."
These are essentially questions of fact, and our
nation is simply too big and too diverse for this
Court to reasonably expect that such standards
could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation . 86
Justice Stevens' dissent in Smith points out
the difficulties he has with the Court's current
framework for dealing with obscenity laws.
Justice Stevens maintains that local community
standards toward obscenity are as difficult to
administer as were the national standards
which the Miller Court declared to be unwork-
able. He notes that local or state standards are
as unascertainable and diverse as are national
standards and, furthermore, are more vulner-
able to subjective opinions, manipulation and
variation than a national standard would be.
He feels that the problem is compounded by
the subjective nature of the decisions which a
jury in an obscenity case must reach.
Justice Stevens concludes that the problems
inherent in the criminal proscription of sex-
ually explicit material are such that the control
See, e.g., Robert L. Anderson, Free Speech and Obscen-
ity: A Search For Constitutional Procedures and Standards,
12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 532, 545-46 (1965); Robert
Krueger, Fair Comment: What's All This ... About
Pornography?, 40 L.A.B. BULL. 505, 511-13 (1965);
Manuel L. Port, Standards of Judging Obscenity- Who?
What? Where?, 46 CHI. B. REC. 405 (1965); Notes and
Comments, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE LJ.
1364, 1375-76 (1966).
86 413 U.S. at 30.
of such materials should be handled through
civil regulations. He notes that the decisions in
cases such as Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.87 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.88 reject
the premise that constitutionally protected
speech is an all or nothing proposition. He
goes on to state that the concept of civil regula-
tion, which has been used to regulate the free
expression of those using sound trucks89 and
issuing securities prospectuses, 9" should be
used to regulate the offensive aspects of the
distribution of obscene materials. However,
Justice Stevens feels that the government can-
not totally suppress such materials.
The Court's decision in Splawn will not serve
to create new confusion because Splawn was
based on the interpretation of a single Califor-
nia case9 1 and has no further implications.
Splawn, however, will do nothing to clarify ques-
tions about the effect that the circumstances
surrounding the sale and distribution have
upon a criminal prosecution for violation of
obscenity laws. The Court, in relying on Ginz-
burg v. United States9 2 and Hamling v. United
States 93 failed to expound on the extent to which
such circumstances may affect a finding of
obscenity vel non. Splawn, on the whole, is no
more than "a logical extension of recent devel-
opments in this area of the law" 94 and is,
therefore, unenlightening.
87 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The Court, in Virginia Phar-
macy Board held, inter alia, that Virginia's statutory
bans on advertising prescription drug prices violated
the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court
held that "commercial speech" was not wholly outside
the protection of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments and that the Virginia statutes in question
exceeded the state's power to control pharmacists'
advertisements.
425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Young the Court upheld
the validity of a Detroit zoning ordinance which
regulated the location of "adult entertainment" estab-
lishments. The Court held that the regulations in
question did not violate the first amendment or the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
89 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
90 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
91 People v. Noroff, 67 Cal. 2d 791, 63 Cal. Rptr.
575, 433 P.2d 479 (1967).
92 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
93 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
9 97 S. Ct. 1756, 1769 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Although Justice Stevens' comment was made
in reference to the Court's decision in Smith, it is
equally applicable to the Court's decision in Splawn.
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Marks can also be viewed as having no far-
reaching effects. The holding in Marks repre-
sents no new or controversial position. To the
extent that one accepts the holdings of the
Court in Miller and Hamling,9 5 one can accept
the holding in Marks. However, to those who
feel that the current obscenity laws violate the
first or fourteenth amendments, Marks is a
case which maintains the unconstitutional doc-
trines of Miller And Hamling. This assertion is
supported by reading the separate opinions of
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Ste-
vens in Marks. These Justices agreed with the
specific holding of the Court despite their dis-
agreement with the majority on the constitu-
tionality of the current obscenity laws.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Ward stated that
the Court's decision in that case undermined
Miller itself and, "undoubtedly, hastens its ulti-
mate downfall. '96 This contention was based
on the belief that Ward marked an abandon-
ment of the promise, held out by Miller, of a
principled effort to respond to the argument
that the inherent vagueness of the concept of
obscenity makes criminal prosecutions for vi-
olation of obscenity statutes constitutionally de-
fective. 9
7
It is difficult to disagree with Justice Stevens'
" See notes 38-39 supra.
96 97 S. Ct. 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 See text accompanying notes 74-79supra.
conclusions. Although the holding of Roth v.
United States,"s that pornography is not consti-
tutionally protected,9 9 retains the support of a
maj6rity of the Court and although the Court
has restricted obscenity prosecutions to "hard
core" pornography, serious due process and
free speech questions remain unanswered, with
no solutions in sight. Many of these problems
stem from the "inherent vagueness of the con-
cept of obscenity." 100 Although Miller assured
specificity in obscenity statutes and held out
the hope of predictability in obscenity prosecu-
tions, last term's obscenity decisions indicate
that predictability and specificity are as far
away, if not further away, than they were when
Miller was decided.
It is difficult, therefore, not to conclude that
these obscenity decisions demonstrate the ina-
bility of the Court, as currently constituted, to
establish a principled framework for the pros-
cription of sexually explicit materials. Further-
more, it appears questionable whether the
Court will ever be able to set standards for the
criminal punishment of those dealing in sex-
ually explicit materials which will satisfy more
than a slim majority of the members of the
Court.
98 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
99 Id. at 485.
100 97 S. Ct. 2085, 2094 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
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